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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
JOANNE ADAMS LEISHMAN,
dba SAMAK Lodge,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No.
10711

KAMAS VALLEY LUMBER
COMPANY, a Corporation
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Counsel for appellant is not quite accurate in
his statement of the facts, and so we shall briefly
set out these facts:
In the spring of 1964, Mrs. Joanne Leishman
commenced reconstruction work on the Samak Lodge
near Kamas, Utah. This lodge consisted of a restau:~ant, kitchen, lounge facilities and restrooms (TR
·iJ. The structure had previously collapsed from the
snows, and so she and a partner, Mr. Ben Dell, looked
around for the type of wood beams that would hold
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the roof structure on their proposed building. The'.
had consulted with Hyland Lumber Company anri
Morrison-Merrill Company in Salt Lake City con.
cerning wood beams. They then contacted Kama'
Valley Lumber Company about the problem, tol; ·
them and showed them a sketch of the type of rool
structure they desired to use and that the previo11,
roof in the building had failed and "we did not want
that problem again." (TR 14).
Mr. Bannister and Mr. Weaver of Kamas Valley Lumber Company were familiar with the build- 1
ing and of its collapsed condition, and represente~
that they could supply the same type and qualitr
beam as the Salt Lake supplier and that responden' '
could save freight and time. A sample laminateG :,
beam was shown that appellant manufactured, am!!
appellant further represented that respondent woulu;
have no problem with the snow depth they wen i
concerned about of up to four feet of snow with thr I
use of their beams (TR 15). Respondent thereupo1: /
ordered the laminated beams for use in the recon· :.
struction of the Samak Lodge.
A short time later, but before the delivery of tht
beams, Mr. Weaver and Mr. Walt Carroll, who wa~
the man in charge of constructing the beams for·
appellant company, came out to the job site when·
they discussed the spacing of the beams as being 0"
eight-foot centers, and Mr. Carroll said if "!ht .•
would put a one-inch camber in the beams, that tha
would be sufficient." (TR 16)
The beams were then delivered with the o~e'
inch camber and at the time of delivery of tn,
beams, resp~ndent was concerned about their a:
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pearance and contacted Mr. Weaver again about it.
Mr. Weaver again assured respondent that the small
gaps in the beams could be filled in, sanded down
and painted, but that the beams were structurally
sound. (TR 20, 21, 149). This was done by respondent and the beams were used on the structure.
Subsequently, respondent heard of someone else
getting a better price on these type beams than they
were paying, so a complaint was made to Mr. Weaver about it, and an adjustment in price was given
(TR 39, 41, 152).
The lodge construction was completed by respondent and they operated as a going business for
a few months. In the latter part of February, 1965,
the beams gave way, the roof collapsed and partially
destroyed the building. When respondent discovered
this they promptly notified appellant of the failure
of their beams, which the expert engineers who examined the beams and testified in this action said
were defectively manufactured.
Respondent had purchased the property originally for $7500.00. It cost her over $6500.00 in
cash in the reconstruction of its former collapsed
condition, and it would have cost about $11,500.00
to restore the building to its condition just prior to
the collapse of these defective beams. (TR 97).
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THERE
\\.A8 A WARRANTY FROM APPELLANT TO
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RESPONDENT OF THE FITNESS FOR USE rr
THE BEAMS FOR THE PARTICULAR USE Ti
WHICH THEY WERE PUT.
1

60-1-15 (1) of Utah code annotated, 1953 statr
as follows:
"Where the buyer, expressly or by iv
plication, makes known to the seller the pai ·
ticular purpose for which the goods are fr
quired, and it appears that the buyer reliesn·
the seller's skill or judgment (whether he 1.
the grower or manufacturer or not), thm i.
an implied warranty that the goods shall l1r
reasonably fit for such purpose."
1

60-1-12 of Utah code annotated, 1953, gives tn1
definition of an express warranty:
"Any affirmation of fact or any prornisr
by the seller relative to the goods is an expm'
warranty, if the natural tendency of sue!
affirmation or promise is to induce the buyer
to purchase the goods, and if the buyer pur
chases the goods relying thereon.''
In the case at bar, we submit that there wa~.
a warranty, both express and implied, that the bearn! I
manufactured and sold by appellant to responden'
were structurally sound and were suitable for tnt
purpose for which they were purchased, and respona
ent relied thereon. The evidence clearly sustains th!!
position and the Court so found.
I
Mr. Ben Dell testified that in talking with ~!:
Weaver of appellant's company:
"The question arose as to the type of rori:
structure we were going to use. I told him tha
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we wanted to use a laminated beam because
the previous roof in the building had failed,
and we did not want that problem again. I told
him I had talked to Hyland Lumber Company, got price on laminated beams and found
that because of a strike from their supplier,
they could not supply the beams for at least
six weeks. Mr. Bannister or Mr. Weaver then
told me that they made laminated beams, they
could supply the same type and quality beam,
and we would save freight from Salt Lake
to Kamas, the price would be approximately
the same."
"During that conversation I asked him
about the beams. He showed me a sample that
he had in his office. At that time I asked him
would that sample hold up to four feet of
snow, because we don't want this roof to go
in again. He left his office, went over to the
... what I later found out was the sales counter, sales desk, referred to a book, came back
and said, 'you would have no problem with
that snow depth'". (TR 14, 15).
These representations were relied upon by Respondent (TR 15).
Now Mr. Ben Dell, previous to the above conversation and representations, had shown appellant
the diagram and sketch and dimensions of the building (TR 12, 37), thus they were familiar with it
and its previous collapsed condition.
Then after the construction work was started,
but before delivery of the beams, representatives
of Kamas Valley Lumber Company, Mr. Weaver and
Mr. Walt Carroll (who was in charge of construct-
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ing the beams), came out to the job site, and Mi.
Dell testified on this visit as follows:
. "They looked. to see what span we wen
going on. We discussed the spacing of the
beams, that they were to be on eight-foot centers. At that time Mr. Carroll said that he
would put a one-inch camber in the beams
that that would be sufficient." (TR 16).
'.

1

Respondent followed the recommendation of getting the beams with the one-inch camber (TR 18,
19), and nothing was heard from Mr. Weaver or
Mr. Carroll as to the spacing of the beams at less
than the eight-foot centers (TR 16).
Then again, at the time of the delivery of the
beams to the job respondents were concerned abou1
the appearance of the beams and they sought out .
Mr. Weaver of appellant company for assurances,
and once again respondent was told that "the beams•
were structurally sound, they would do the job that ·
we wanted." Further, it was suggested by Mr.
Weaver that bolts could be put through the beams if
they were concerned, "but really we didn't need it be· ,
cause the beams were structurally sound" (TR 20)., I
Then Mr. Weaver recommended that the gaps ll1
the laminations and appearance of the beams coula ·
be corrected and cleared up by "filling in," sanding
down and painting. Again this recommendation of
appellant was followed by respondent (TR 20, 21,
148,149).
I
Mrs. Leishma.n also testified as to these c?nveri [
sations and especially as to the representat10n ° •
appellant as to the structural quality of the beams. •
(TR 119)
1
1

1
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Counsel for appellant makes a point of the fact
that the defectiveness and structural weaknesses of
the beams were obvious to Mrs. Leishman and Mr.
Dell. This is not the case, (TR 21, 118, 119). The
evidence shows they were primarily concerned about
the appearance of these exposed beams and they
were satisfied with the assurances of the manufacturer as to the structural soundness. They were not
engineers or experts in this field and they had to rely
on the skill and judgment of the manufacturer here.
Why would respondent spend several thousand dollars in this building that had already once before
collapsed from the snow and then knowingly put in
defective beams on the new structure? This argument is ridiculous, and the lower court wisely would
not buy it.
Yes, there is ample evidence to support the
court's finding of a warranty of fitness for use here.
(See also Nielson v. Hermansen, 109 U. 180, 166
P 2nd 536 and Nephi Processing Plant, Inc. v. Talbott, 24 7 F 2nd 771.

POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN NOT MAKING A FINDING THAT BUYER FAILED TO
GIVE NOTICE OF THE BREACH OF WARRANTY.
As was discussed under Point I, appellant continued to represent the structural soundness of their
beams and that it would do the job intended and
which they personally observed even after delivery of
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said beams (TR 20, 21, 148, 149). Thus there wa'
no knowledge of a breach of these representation,
and warranties until the beams actually failed anu
collapsed, and then it was that respondent gave due
notice to appellant of the breach, and the court Si1
found.
.
The code provision quoted by Counsel for ap.
pellant, 60-3-9 of the Utah code annotated 195i,
was only partially quoted. The applicable part of tha>
law, and which holds for respondent's position is a~
follows:
"In the absence of express or impllell
agreement of the parties, acceptance of the
goods by the buyer shall not discharge the
seller from liability in damages, or other legal
remedy for breach of any promise or war·
ranty in the contract to sell or the sale."
In our case the warranty of structural souml·
ness was reiterated again by appellant to respondem
after delivery, and acceptance was made based upon
those assurances.
POINT III
THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING
THAT APPELLANT REPRESENTED THEHI~
BEAMS SOLD WOULD STAND THE WEIG 1
OF UP TO FOUR FEET OF SNOW.
In answer to counsel's or appellant's statemen'
in his brief that "nowhere in the record is there an1
claim that defendant represented that the beam:
would stand the weight of up to four feet of snow,
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we merely refer the court to our argument in Point
I where the testimony is set out in detail on this
question (TR 14, 15. See also (TR 29) where reference is made again to the subject.)
The court therefore had very adequate testimony and evidence as to this representation to support its finding.
POINT IV
THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING

THAT PLAINTIFF RELIED UPON DEFENDANT'S REPRESENTATION THAT THE BEAMS

WERE FIT FOR THE USE FOR WHICH PLAINTIFF PURCHASED THEM.

It is true that both Mrs. Leishman and Mr. Dell
were concerned about the snow problem in the
Kamas area. This is one of the reasons they were
relying on the skill and judgment of the manufacturer of the beams and that said beams would be
suitable for their purpose in holding the roof on
that particular building which had previously collapsed and which appellant and their salesmen were
entirely familiar with (TR 12, 15, 20, 37, 153).

Mr. Weaver of appellant company himself testified that he was very familiar with Samak Lodge
before the sale of said beams, and he knew the purpose and use to be made of the beams by respondent,
and he actually recommended their beam for this
job. He further showed the sample of how it was
manufactured, all for the purpose, of course, to sell
respondent on its fitness for use in the job (TR 153,
154, 155).
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.
Respondent thereupon bought the beams, reh
mg upon appellant's recommendations.
·.
Mr. Dell testified further in the conversatior
with appellant as to the fitness of the beams fo
the snow problem in the area as follows:

Q. "Based upon order the beams?"

or did you thereupor

A. "A week later"

Q. "I ask you, Mr. Dell, if you relied up·
on the conversations that had taken plare.''
A. "Yes, sir, I did."

Q. "Did you communicate these conver· ·
sations to Mrs. Leishman?"
'
A. "Yes".

Q. "Did she authorize you to order thesf
beams?"
A. "Yes, Sir."
It should be mentioned here that an adjustmeni
in price on the beams was given because someont
else had bought beams for less money in the area
and no rebate was given because of defects in tht
beams. Mr. Weaver himself, of appellant compan1
stated (TR 152):
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A. "He (Dell) came in and complained
because someone else had bought the beams
for less money."
Q. "Was an adjustment made for that?"

A. "I understood that that was made."
Mr. Ben Dell's testimony was also clear on this

point when he said (TR 29) :

"One of the people living in the area came
down, looked at the beams, told me that he had
paid a dollar thirty four for the same type
beam; and that is when I questioned Mr.
Weaver as to why we were being charged one
dollar eighty four when they had sold it for
one dollar thirty four to somebody else."
As to the question of Mr. Weaver suggesting

bolts in the beams, the fact that respondent didn't
do it, (TR 39) shows even further their reliance on
Mr. Weaver's statement "but really we didn't need
it because the beams were structurally sound." (TR
20)

The other arguments in counsel for appellant's

point IV of his brief are either not factual or have

no bearing on the question of reliance of fitness for
use, and we submit that the trial court held correctly
on this point.

POINT V
THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN ITS FINDING THAT THE BEAMS WERE NOT AS
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STRUCTURALLY SOUND AND STRONG AR
THEY APPEARED AND SHOULD HAVE
BEEN, IF PROPERLY MANUFACTURED, AND
THAT THE BUILDING COLLAPSED BY REASON OF THE STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IN
THEIR MANUFACTURE.
Mr. Joseph F. Patrick, Sr., a structural engi
neer and an expert witness testifying in this case,
and being specifically familiar with the processes
for the manufacture of and use of laminated wood
products (TR 52) , testified as follows; (TR 54, 55):
Q. "Assuming wood beams containing
eight laminations were installed over a span
of twenty-four feet with four-foot over-hangs
on either end, and assuming further that these '
beams were properly constructed and were
positioned on eight-foot centers in Kamas,
Utah, do you have an opinion as to whether
or not those beams would be structurally '
sound to contain the roof?"
!

A. "Yes, I have an opinion, it would re· I
quire some qualification."
I'

,

A. "The process of laminating beams is
both simple and complicated. There are many
factors that influence the strength of any
given beam, and of course on just the visn~I '
inspection it is very difficult to ascertm1
whether all of these particular elements hm't ,
been met, and these are the qualifications."
"Now, as to the specific beams and some
of the specific reasons why I feel that the
beams themselves will not or would not ac:
complish what they were purported to 1111
to do" ...
!

1

.
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The court: "Well, I don't know what they
were reported to you to do, but he's asked
you whether or not they are sound, and I suppose he means sufficiently strong to withhold
the normal snows that would fall at the place
where this house was."
A. "And on the basis of that particular
statement, your honor, I would say that there
are several areas where these beams fail to
meet the standards of construction of the industry."
Q. "Mr. Patrick, before we get into that,
let me restate my question to you. If you
were to assume that these beams met the
standards of industry, would they have been
adequate to do the job?

A. "Provided the proper stress grades of
lumber had been used, yes, Sir."
Then again after cross examination and after
the testimony of the engineer, Mr. Wadsworth, Mr.
Patrick testified again as follows (TR 142):
Q. "All right, now, in view of the definition which he's given and the testimony of
Mr. Wadsworth concerning failure, may I ask
whether or not this beam if properly constructed would have contained the load without collapse?"

A. "In my opinion, if a beam of these
dimensions properly laminated, installed at
eight feet, had been subjected to a load in ~he
neighborhood of forty, forty to forty-five
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pounds, it very likely would not have col.
lapsed. It would not have had the normal factor of safety." (See also TR 75 on this point).
Now both engineers testified that the beam~
were defectively manufactured, there is no question '.
about that, and the roof actually collapsed. So whether the roof would have collapsed anyway if properly
manufactured, Mr. Patrick, the expert, thinks not,
but for counsel for appellant to categorically state
so, is ridiculous, and it is purely a matter of conjecture.

i

1

The judge felt there was ample evidence to sup- .
port this finding as stated in his ruling in the lower '
court (TR 208) :
"Now, it may be that there should have
been four-foot centers instead of eight-foot
centers, but it wasn't an eight-foot center that :
caused this beam, this roof to give way. The ·
thing that caused this roof to give way is the
defect in the beam itself."
POINT VI
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING
THAT PLAINTIFF DID NOT KNOW OR HAVE '
REASON TO KNOW THAT THE BEAMS PUR· ,
CHASED FROM DEFENDANT WERE OF INE'.,
FERIOR QUALITY OR THAT THEY WER i
STRUCTURALLY DEFECTIVE, AND THE :
COURT DID NOT ERR AS TO THE QUESTIO~ !
OF WAIVER OF PLAINTIFFS' RIGHT TO ·
CLAIM BREACH OF WARRANTY, CONTRIBU· j
TORY NEGLIGENCE, AND ASSUMPTION OF .
RISK.
f

·

1
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We have set out a partial argument on the question of knowledge on the part of plaintiff as to the
defectiveness and structural soundness of the beams
in our Point IV, which we refer the court to. Counsel
for appellant states in his Point IV ( 7), "Weaver
told them to put the beams on four-foot centers (TR
151)". Mr. Weaver testified actually that a month
or so after respondent opened for business, a casual
observation was made on the subject (TR 150, 151).
Again in his Point IV ( 8) counsel states, "Bannister told them the beams would not hold as placed
... " (TR 171). Here again, it was after the beams
were placed that the purported conversation took
place and his statement was a passing comment only,
but nowhere did he say that the beams would not
hold as placed. He actually testified to the contrary
-that he made no such statement. These statements
and others made by Mr. Thacker were denied by
respondent, and anyway they have nothing to do
with knowledge of defective beams on the part of
respondent.
At the time of delivery of the beams, there was
no knowledge of structural defects or unsoundness
of the beams, (TR 20, 21, 119), but respondent did
complain about their appearance. The testimony of
Mrs. Leishman and Mr. Dell was corroborated by Mr.
Weaver of appellant's company on this point (TR
148, 149) :
A. "Shortly after the beams were delivered, Mr. Dell had come down and complained about appearance ... "

A. "The objection he raised to the beams
were some voids, there was ... "
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Q. "Some voids?"
A. "By voids I mean slight openings such
as this in the finger joints."
·
Q. "You mean the openings ... you have
pointed to the areas where we have heard testimony that there is improper lamination. Is
that what you mean by the voids?"
A. "Yes."
Q. "He had some objection to that?"
A. "From appearance standpoint."
Q. "And what else was said?"
A. "There was some mud on the beams
because there was snow and mud on the
ground, and they were dumped there, un·
loaded. I suggested that he possibly could fill
those voids with some kind of plastic or wood
because we were speaking merely from the
standpoint of appearance now."
Again, merely because Mr. Weaver or Mr. Car·
roll suggested putting in bolts in the beams if there
was any concern about them, but assured respondent,
"but really we didn't need it because the beams were ·
structurally sound (TR 20), did not impart knowl· i
edge to respondent of structural unsoundness a~o ,
defects. (See also TR 57). It would take an expert ID
the field to determine such structural unsoundness, ,
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as was evidenced by the testimony of both the expert
engineer witnesses.
Mr. Wads worth had to look twice, closely before
he could say the joint was not a good one (TR 136,
137). Then, after viewing carefully one of the delaminated beams, and in response to the question
"Does that delamination indicate improper or weak
bonding of glue?", Mr. Wadsworth answered, "not
necessarily, in my opinion." (TR 137).
Again Mr. Wadsworth was asked (TR 139):
Q. "But the mere fact that there is spacing at the butt end of the finger joint, is that
an indication of weakness within the joint
itself?"
A. "No. It is the width of it that would
indicate it."
Mr. Patrick testified, as we have already argued
in our Point V: "There are many factors that influence the strength of any given beam, and of
course, on just the visual inspection it is very difficult to ascertain whether all of these particular elements have been met ... "
Thus, the court properly found that plaintiff
had no knowledge that the beams purchased were
structurally defective. The judge, in his ruling on
this, pointed out as follows (TR 208):
"I believe these plaintiffs would no more
have put a defective beam up there than they
would have flown because they knew that the
thing they had bought for some $7500.00 had
been knocked down by snow, and they wanted
good beams."
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Now in regard to appellant's argument as tri
waiver, contributory negligence, and assumption of
risk set out in his Point IX, we submit that when,
there is no show~ng by appellant of knowledge u/
structural defectiveness of the beams on the part
of respondent, such theory and argument must immediately fail, even if the theory were sound, which
it is not.
The cases and authorities cited by appellant are
either not in point or involve only those situations
where the buyer must have actual knowledge of
the defect, continue to use the goods and additional
damages result from such use. And it is further
noted that even in those cases that may involve these
elements, where the continued use has been at the
suggestion or instigation of the seller, the courts
still allow recovery to the buyer for his damages
(See 33 ALR 2nd 513, 517).
Therefore we feel the trial court was fully justified in not finding for appellant on these points.

1.

POINT VII
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING '
THAT PLAINTIFF MADE NO COMPROMIS~
WITH DEFENDANT ON PRICE REDUCTIO~1 I
BY REASON OF STRUCTURAL DEFECTS INR
THE BEAMS, AND THE COURT DID NOT ER
IN NOT GRANTING A NEW TRIAL OR TO SNEGT
ASIDE THE JUDGMENT AFTER HEARI
ADDITIONAL TESTIMONY ON THE EVNl·
DENCE GIVEN BY W. WARD BLAZZARD 0
THE QUESTION OF PRICE REDUCTION.
!

1
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Counsel for appellant states in his brief at point
VIII that Mrs. Leishman admitted the rebate was
given because of structural defects. This simply is
not the fact. Mrs. Leishman's testimony was to the
effect that the structural defects of the beams did
1wt have anything to do with the discount. She testified as follows (TR 119) :
A. "The discount was given later, yes."

Q. "And that was because of all the factors, one including the structural aspects of
the beams. Isn't that true?"
A. "No, Sir."

·
'

'
'

Again, we refer the court to our argument in
Point IV of this brief on this question, where it
is clear, both from Mr. Dell's testimony and Mr.
Weaver's testimony that the reduction in price was
by reason of someone else having bought the beams
for less money (TR 39, 152). It was Mr. Weaver of
appellant company who respondent was dealing with,
not Mr. Blazzard, and so appellant is bound by Mr.
Weayer's own testimony on this point, which is
very clear.
Just how the credit memorandum in the hands
of Mr. Blazzard received the notation "adjustment
0f price due to dissatisfaction in laminating" got
there, when it was not entered on the copy given to
respondent, and whether or not the judge believed
Mr. Blazzard's explanation of putting the notation
there himself (it was not entered there by Mr. Weav-
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er, who had the conversation as to price adjustment
with respondent), makes no difference in this case.
Further, we do not believe nor recollect the
judge stating that he would be obligated to dismiss
plaintiff's action, if what Mr. Blazzard said was in
fact true. It appears nowhere in the record, and
even if the statement were made, it would have no
bearing on this case.
The trial judge, by his further order, merely
found that he believed Mr. Blazard had not tried d~
liberately to pull a fast one on the court. This does
not mean that the trial judge had to throw out the
testimony of Mrs. Leishman, Mr. Dell, and Mr.
Weaver, as to the reason for the price reduction.
Again, there was ample evidence to support the
court's finding on the reason for the reduction in
price on the beams, and that it was not by reason
of any structural defects.
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POINT VIII
THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING
RESPONDENT SUFFERED DAMAGES IN THE
AMOUNT OF $7,500.00.
As stated in 22 Am. J ur. 2nd, 190, Sec. 132:
"The goal of the damage remedy in cases
involving injury to a person's interest in real
property is that of compensation. One whose
interest in realty has been injured by the tortious act or omission of another is entitled to
those damages which will compensate him
for the injury sustained. Generally this principle is translated into the following two
rules of damages : ( 1) the injured party is
entitled to recover the difference between the
value of the real property immediately before
and immediately after the injury (often referred to as the 'diminution in value' rule) ;
( 2) the injured party is entitled to recover
the cost of repairing the realty by restoring it
to its condition immediately prior to the injury (generally referred to as the 'restoration' or 'cost or repair' rule)."
Appellant's counsel cites in his brief the diminution in value rule, as the applicable rule. In the footnotes of the cases referred to under appellants citation in 22 Am. Jur. 2nd, 194, Sec. 134, the case of
Curtis v. Fruin-Colnon Contracting Company, 363
Mo. 676; 253 SW 2nd 158 is cited to the effect that
the "Restoration or cost of repair" rule may be apP.licable in these type cases where the cost of restoration is less than the diminution in value and the
realty can be repaired. The trial court considered
this in hearing testimony on the damages (TR 97).
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Consequently there was not only evidence in the
record under the "diminution of value" rule, which
am~unted to $17,500.00 ~amages, but also expert
testimony on the "restoration or cost of repair" rule.
Mr. Robert Gray testified as a general contractor that he had made a study of the collapsed Samak
Lodge and had carefully calculated his figures in
the cost of reconstructing and restoring the premises. His estimate of cost for the various items to do
the job was testified to in detail with a cost of restoring the premises as it was just prior to the collapse
of the roof structure of $11,506.35 (TR 98, 99, 100).
Now Mrs. Leishman who was the owner, builder, and operator of the Samak Lodge property and
who had developed a going business there, as well
as had offers of purchase on the property after the
business was a going concern (TR 104, 105) was a
qualified witness to testify of the property value just
prior to the collapse of the building as well as its ·
value after the collapse and thus the testimony of
these values of $25,000.00 before the collapse and i
$7,500.00 after the destruction is in the record as
competent evidence (See 20 Am. Jur. 751, Sec. 892).
Furthermore Mrs. Leishman's testimony was
uncontradicted. Appellant's attorney offered no evi·
dence whatsoever on the question of value of the 1
property nor on the cost of restoring the same, and
the trial judge was fully justified to weigh both Mr.
Gray's testimony and Mrs. Leishman's testimony~
to these damages. (See 20 Am. Jur., 1030-103..,
Sec. 1180)
Thus the court was in a position in this. c~se '
to adopt the lesser of the two amounts, the dunin·
1
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ished value or the cost of restoring, as the measure
of damages.
In 22 Am. Jur. 2nd, 204-205, Sec. 140 it states:
"It has also been held that the owner is
entitled to recover the entire cost of restoring
a damaged building to its former condition,
unless such cost exceeds its diminution in
value as the result of the injury, in which
event the recovery must be limited to the
amount of such diminution. Under this rule
the court should receive evidence both as to
the cost of restoring the building and as to
the amount of its diminished value, and then
adopt as the measure of damages the lesser of
the two amounts."

Counsel for appellant cites the case of Gilmore
v. Cohen, 386 P. 2nd 81 (Ariz.) for the proposition
that only nominal damages should be allowed. The
facts in that case showed no apparent actual damage, while in the case at bar, there was actual damage apparent from the fact that the roof collapsed,
and it was only a question of how much damage.
Mrs. Leishman had spent in cash over $6500.00 and
with some donated labor to restore the building and
rnof structure before (TR 104, 110), and Mr. Gray
testified that it would cost $11,506.35 to restore the
Lodge, so there was no question about the fact of
damage being proven. The court in the Gilmore case
stated:
"It is firmly established, of course, in
this state as elsewhere, that certainty in
omount of damages is not essential to recovery when the fact of damage is proven . . .
'rhis is simply a recognition that doubts as to
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the extent o~ the injury _sh~uld be resolved lll
favor of the mnocent plamtiff and against the
wrongdoer."
We submit that the court in the Gilmore case
supports respondents position on damages.

It should also be pointed out that the trial judge
made a special, personal trip to view for himself the
damaged Samak Lodge to consider the extent of
damage and salvage material (TR 192, 208). Consequently, from the evidence received and from the
personal inspection by the judge, the court made a
proper finding as to damages in this case.
CONCLUSION

It is apparent from an examination of the facts
and evidence in this case that the trial court properly
found in favor of Respondent, and the judgment of
the lower court should be affirmed and the Respondents awarded their costs herein.
Respectfully submitted,
SPAFFORD & YOUNG
2188 Highland Drive,
Suite 201
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

Attorneys for Respondent
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